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The question posed for this keynote address is deliberately controversial, of course, but 
although the issues are still to become fully apparent, I believe that the controversy I want 
to discuss is real and will become pressing.  We start with the two key terms that give us 
our issue, ‘old’ and ‘rehabilitation’, and then attempt to contextualise the issue, reflecting 
along the way on why our question is beginning to be asked so often, even if rarely as 
explicitly as we are doing today. 
 
The first thing to notice is the rapid growth of the older segment of Australia’s population 
and the corresponding effect on our understanding of the term ‘old’.  Of greatest 
importance is the number of people aged 80 years or more, since it is this group, the ‘old 
old’, that requires most care.  In 1976, one in six older people (those 65 and above) was 
aged 80 and over; by 1999 it was one in five; by 2016 it is projected to be one in four; and 
by 2041 one in three older people will be over 80 years.  That amounts to one-twelfth of 
the entire population( Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing , 2000). 
 
One of the side effects of this change is that the meaning of ‘old’ is changing.  
Stereotypes being as robust as they are, the aged are still seen by most elements in society 
as frail and dependent by definition, yet many current retirees really don’t see themselves 
as being among the elderly.  For example, 80 percent of baby boomers, those born 
between 1945-1964, plan to work during retirement.(How baby boomers will 
revolutionize retirement and transform …. 
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1891620177/design60b-20/002-5521792-
3182466 )  
 
So, how ‘old’ we feel is a very individual matter.  The importance of this subjective sense 
of where we are in our lifetime trajectory can best be appreciated by looking at one of the 
most influential but least noticed forces to have been unleashed on the health services in 
recent decades: the elevation of consumer opinion.  It is clear that the individual will 
expect his or her perception to count for more than it has in the past.  
 
Our second key term, rehabilitation, means, according to the Oxford dictionary, ‘to 
restore to effectiveness or normal life by training etc., esp. after imprisonment or illness.’ 
(The Concise Oxford Dictionary COD9). How will the ageing of the Australian 
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population over the next three decades impact on our approach to the practice of 
rehabilitation?  How far and for whom, in our changing context, will this activity and the 
goal it embodies remain practicable?  This is the heart of our question.  To open up that 
question – I don’t claim to have the answer – I want to talk about the rationing of health 
care, the impact of dementia and the business of knowing when enough is enough and the 




In fact, rationing is an inescapable part of the human condition and it manifests itself in 
the act of budgeting. (Slovic, P & Fischoff, B ,1978)  Are we as a society prepared to 
spend an extra dollar on life-saving/enhancing health interventions if it means reducing 
some people’s post-tax income to the point where they must reduce their private 
consumption expenditures?  Do we need or want this particular health intervention as 
much as we want to buy some new defence equipment or subsidise research into 
alternative fuels or cut the road toll or reduce crime or defeat salinity?  
 At another level, covert rationing is already widespread in health through differences in 
the individual person’s ability to pay, with the impact falling most heavily on those with 
the highest needs, usually the elderly and the young.  Access to rehabilitation, the costs of 
medications, the rapid reduction in bulk billing – indeed its disappearance in many areas 
– open up a new angle on our question: are the old getting the opportunity to be 
rehabilitated, and who among them is not?  We know areas with the lowest incomes also 
have the lowest rates of Medicare bulk-billing.  You have less chance of being 
rehabilitated – or having a healthy life – if you are poor, unemployed or socially isolated. 
(Wilkinson, R and Marmot, M , 2003)  If you are an indigenous Australian your chance 
of becoming ‘old’, let alone having a healthy old age, is slim indeed (National Strategy 
for an Ageing Australia World Class discussion paper, Highlights sheet 
http://www.ageing.health.gov.au/ofoa/documents/rtf/wcchi.rtf ) 
Of course, price rationing - ‘you deserve what you can pay for’ – is not by any means the 
only form of rationing in use or on offer.  Many health service theorists have sought to 
develop more rational, more transparent forms of rationing based on more thoughtful and 
more egalitarian principles than the ability to pay.  A good deal of attention is being paid 
to the project of developing rational, replicable, evidence-based objective measures of an 
individual’s legitimate claim on a community’s health resources as a means of rationing 
those resources without succumbing to the crudities of the free market approach that 
simply gives the prize to the highest bidder.  Work in Scandinavia and, in the USA, the 
state of Oregon has focused on a range of related concepts such as QALYs (Quality 
Adjusted Life Years) which aims to work out the benefits of a particular intervention in 
terms of the additional years of high quality life purchased by each health dollar. 
(McGregor, M ,2003)  We might term this a ‘return-on-investment’ model. 
 
An alternative approach talks about EQALYs (Equity Quality Adjusted Life Years) in an 
effort to highlight the difference between spending additional health dollars on a person 
with a good life expectancy versus spending those dollars on someone whose prognosis 
and circumstances are not good simply because it is that person who, as we might say in 
the vernacular, ‘deserves the break’( Jacobsson, C., Lindholm, L., Engstrom, B., Norberg, 
A., 2001)   We might term this a ‘compensation’ model. 
 
Such measures can be used to identify diseases or groups of ailments that merit 
interventions above the claims of other diseases or groups of ailments; and they give at 
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least some tentative shape and transparency to the question about choosing between 
classes of patients.  But as yet they can do little to resolve the puzzle about what to spend 
on a particular patient, partly because of the innumerable complicating factors that 
distinguish any individual from another and partly because of the human and ethical 
difficulties of applying such formulae to a living, breathing, contexted individual lying in 
a bed in your ward. 
 
That moment at the bedside reminds us that, however positive members of this audience 
may wish to be, however enthusiastically we may wish to respond to the ‘healthy ageing’ 
concept, we cannot discount chronological ageing and its effects.  Many older people 
have multiple conditions, some chronic, some acute, that may not of themselves limit a 
life style.  However, if there is a critical life event, a fall, an accident, a stroke, we have to 
be realistic about how much that body will heal, how easily and how quickly; in other 
words, about the additional resources needed to restore the person to their previous 
functional ability.  There is no doubt in my mind that, in the next decade or two,  more 
precise measurements of how well rehabilitation works for the elderly will be developed, 
and the effect of ageing on likely success of rehabilitation will come into consideration in 
new ways, perhaps sharply so.      
 
If we look beneath the surface of contemporary change in health philosophies and 
strategies and review the history of healthcare trends over the past century, we will see 
that we are still, in practice, in the grip of the Curative Syndrome and we remain some 
way from the Era of Adjustment.  The concept of healthy ageing, coupled with a greater 
degree of individual self-reliance, is in part, it does not hurt to admit, a cost-driven 
necessity designed to wean us off the ‘cure-at-all-costs-because-we-can’ mentality back to 
a more accepting model of ageing and its associated bodily and mental changes.  The 
question I am raising today can be re-stated by asking: how much time have we got to 
make that change and what pressures will arise while we are making it?  
 
Research in relation to health care rationing has found, not surprisingly, that a diversity of 
public preferences, the coexistence of pluralistic viewpoints and several thresholds 
indicating the switch among competing criteria and principles, make it necessary not only 
to collect empirical evidence but also to start a debate about the basis which concerns and 
objectives are acceptable for public policy and which should be rejected. (Dixon P , 2003) 
The truth is that, when asked directly, consumers find it impossible to ‘ration’ and 
certainly do not want rationing undertaken on the basis of any one factor such as age. 
(Rationing care from limited funds,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/health/251988.stm) 
 However, when the question is hidden under talk of tax cuts and the choice is made at the 
ballot box, we have often chosen differently 
 
The traditional Australian self-image relating to our belief in a ‘fair go for all’ will 
increasingly be in tension with appeals to the hip-pocket nerve; and who can say that we 
have made a proud start in dealing with this issue over the past two to three decades?  
Discrimination on the grounds of age is officially not sanctioned in Australia and is illegal 
under anti-discrimination  and human rights legislation.  Note that both the non-market 
rationing systems outlined earlier explicitly take age into account, although in different 
ways.  Note too that the encroaching system of price rationing favoured by Australian 
governments also clearly distributes opportunities and denial by indirect reference to age-
linked variables such as income and wealth while allowing us to avoid noticing what is 
being done in our name.   
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Let me force the issue now by inviting you once again to reconsider the question raised 
earlier?  Are we as a society, are you as an individual, prepared to spend an extra dollar 
on life-saving/enhancing health interventions if it means reducing some people’s post-tax 
income to the point where they must reduce their private consumption expenditures?  
Does anything about the way you answer change when the population segment requiring 
the most care has just doubled as a proportion of the total community?  What if that 
segment is of very advanced years and has the bulk of their healthy fully-functioning life 
behind them?  What difference if any does it make if that segment is already consuming 
health resources at about three times the rate of other segments?   
It is far from my purpose today to expound or to advocate any of these approaches to 
rationing.  I merely suggest that this work on rationing models, already actively pursued 
in many quarters, gives an early glance at some of the answers that are likely to be 
proposed to questions most of us have scarcely learned to ask as yet. 
 
 For the moment, if you are old, poor and dependent on free care, your chances of 
rehabilitation are slipping away.  And let us not be seduced by easy egalitarian moralising 
or sentimentality or tirades against bean counters.  If we want to be influential in 
determining the answers Australia adopts to that difficult rationing question we must be 
prepared to find other and better ways of reconciling the gap between the possibilities for 
better health and the resources available to pursue them.  We have to be very clear about 
what giving people an equal chance actually means, as well as the difficulties in achieving 
it.  If there is a chance to be rehabilitated in a meaningful way then, as advocates for 
rehabilitation and the elderly person, our concentration must be on ensuring that, at least, 
we do nothing to needlessly divide the human family in the course of adjusting to 





Last year in Australia there were over 162,000 people with dementia.  The prevalence of 
dementia is growing rapidly.  In fact, we are on the edge of an epidemic of dementia in 
this country, and we are still poorly prepared for it.  The chances of having a dementing 
condition, of developing the plaques and tangles found in Alzheimer’s disease, or having 
multi- infarcts leaving brain damage are about one in four if you are over `80.  This being 
so, we will be reaching the 500,000 mark around 2040.  Dementia is more common than 
skin cancer, yet with significantly less investment in public health initiatives. (Access 
Economics , 2003) 
 
Of course there is no rehabilitation presently possible for dementia per se; and you may 
be wondering why I mention it in this connection.  One of the most chilling aspects of the 
impending dementia epidemic is that, for many of us, it will bring our first intimate 
experience of seeing a person we know well lose all the distinguishing characteristics by 
which we feel we have known them, by which they have constituted themselves as 
autonomous human beings deserving of all the interest, dignity and respect that each 
person deserves.  They will lose their personhood in the eyes of those who are around 
them.  Will their equal claim to other entitlements also be lost or weakened?  I am afraid 
that this question may come forward more and more insistently, not about rehabilitating 
people from dementia but rehabilitating people with dementia who also happen to have, 
for example, a broken hip or even a broken arm.  If our ability to diagnose dementia 
continues to outpace our ability to cure or ameliorate it, at what point will the person with 
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dementia be afforded less than their equal share of scarce health resources, including less 
and less rehabilitative care? 
 
This brings us to the question of choice, or the choice that is left to the older person. 
  
Medical  futility 
 
The concept of medical futility can be traced back to the writings of Hippocrates’s 
discussion of refusing to treat those who are ‘overmastered’ by their disease.  The concept 
was formally articulated by the medical profession in the early 1990’s and guidelines 
proposed to give form to it.   In 1999 Texas adopted a law regulating end-of –life 
decisions, providing due process for resolving medical futility disputes and other ethical 
disagreements.  Two years after its enactment, research shows that the law has proved to 
be useful.( Fine, R and Mayo, T ,2003)     
 
There is more and more information about making our individual wishes for health care 
known and a variety of formal legislative and professional guidelines, as well as informal 
practices, have been developed to regulate the use of these expressed wishes.    
For example, the British Medical Association has published guidelines for decision-
making in withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging medical treatment (British 
Medical Association, 1999).  Main points arising from the guidelines include: 
• that a voluntary refusal by a competent adult, or a valid refusal by way of an 
advance directive, must be respected (p66); 
• that  “[i]t is not an appropriate goal of medicine to prolong life at all costs, with no 
regard to its quality or the burdens of treatment” (p65); 
• that …”treatment that does not provide net benefit to the patient (beyond mere 
existence) may, ethically and legally, be withheld or withdrawn and the goal of 
medicine should shift to the palliation of symptoms” (p65); 
• that “[b]efore a decision is made to withhold or withdraw treatment, adequate 
time, resources and facilities should be made available to permit a thorough … 
assessment of the patient’s condition including, where appropriate, the patient’s 
potential for self-awareness. … This should involve a multidisciplinary team with 
expertise in undertaking this type of assessment” (p68); 
• that “account is taken of the views of other health professionals involved in the 
patient’s care (as well as) people close to the patient … (who) … can provide 
important information to help ascertain whether the patient would have considered 
life-prolonging treatment to be beneficial” (p68). 
 
But in modern Australia the decaying body and the wish to die have become political 
problems. Legislation has long been an accepted way of dealing with a community 
problem and this is the case again.  It has become a problem because of the emphasis on 
life-saving technology and a doubt in the mind of some people whether the life belongs 
to the person or the state.  
 
The job for consumers, or consumer advocates, of regaining for the patient control of 
their own body against these competing claims is difficult.  We need to understand and 
respect the rights of the individual who does not want to be rehabilitated, but has been 
‘given’ to the health system by well meaning friends or relatives.  If an advance directive 
has been written, we, as responsible health professionals, must do all in our power to 
honour the wishes expressed in that ( Kuhse, H ,1999). As system members and 
administrators that means putting in place protocols that ensure proper process and full 
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recognition of patient rights. As nurses we must advocate strongly for those who do not 
wish to be rehabilitated, and find ways to plan a peaceful and dignified  end-of-life 
programme.  Why do the very people who have made ‘choice’ a mantra in the design of 
public policy resist a clear public demand for choice in this most vital of questions?  
 
I say it again: the necessary changes in policy and public attitudes will not be easy.  Some 
of us will instinctively describe this in negative terms, as ‘withdrawing treatment’ or not 
treating or not rehabilitating; while others will instinctively see the same decision as 
treating the patient in the way they have chosen to be treated.  In some cases these 
decisions may be easier to cope with as they can be based on evidence, for example that 
the insertion of a PEG tube will not increase the quantity or quality of life for a person 
with late-stage dementia.  In some cases, for example, where a person chooses not to eat 
or drink, it may be harder to assist the patient in honouring their wishes.  But these 





This paper has put forward the view that society’s attitudes and approaches to the 
rehabilitation of older people, that is the attempt to restore the person to their former self, 
are becoming more complex and are likely to become decidedly more so over the next 
three decades.  This will result from the confluence of current demographic trends, the 
explosive impact of advances in medical sciences and technologies, the dilemmas arising 
from consumer rights and the fact that health costs are rising significantly faster than the 
cost of living.   
 
There is no presumption in my argument that rehabilitation is always a good idea; and, 
indeed, the final section of the paper was devoted to developments relating our need for 
means of knowing when rehabilitation should end and palliation should begin. 
 
The increasing problem of medical futility, arising from our ability to keep people alive, 
and the increase in the consumer’s choice as expressed in advance directives and living 
wills, are factors that need increasingly to be considered.  These questions pose many 
dilemmas for our traditional approach to care in all its forms, but, for you, in choices 
about rehabilitation. 
 
I have tried to raise some troubling questions that I think will soon be rather more 
familiar to all of us than they are now.  The truth is I never really hoped to answer the 
question I was posed; but if I have left you with some food for thought I shall be well 
pleased. 
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